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Abstract
Most representationalists argue that perceptual experience has to be
representational because phenomenal looks are, by themselves, represen-
tational. Charles Travis (2004) argues that looks cannot represent. I
argue that perceptual experience has to be representational due to the
way the visual system works.
1 Introduction
Representationalism has been a prominent, if not the prominent, view regarding
the nature of mental states for the last two decades. According to representa-
tionalism, phenomenal properties are identical to (or supervene on) represen-
tational properties.1 So it is not very surprising that most of the challenges
that representationalism has faced are weird cases in which it is argued that
phenomenal character and representational content, in certain circumstances,
could come apart. Although these cases pose serious threats to specific versions
of representationalism, they do not undermine the fundamental insight behind
representationalism in general: the idea that perceptual experience necessarily
possesses representational content. Call this the Strong Content View. Note
that although representationalism entails the Strong Content View, the latter
does not entail the former. The Strong Content View is weaker in that it is silent
on the relation between representational properties and phenomenal properties.
Many people have taken the Strong Content View for granted or as intu-
itively obvious. David Chalmers believes it is “intuitively very clear that per-
ceptual phenomenology, by its very nature, involves the representation of the
external world.”2 Others have assumed that the very idea of phenomenology is
sufficient to show that perceptual experience is representational. Alex Byrne
claims that the content thesis “should be no more controversial than the notion
that a subject’s belief state represents the world.”3 Susanna Schellenberg ar-
1Chalmers (2004), Tye (1995 & 2002), Dretske (1995).
2Chalmers (2004: 157). Emphasis added.
3Byrne (2001: 201).
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gues that “the mere fact that the world seems a certain way when one perceives
entails that the perception has content.”4 And Terry Horgan and John Tienson
suggest that “[t]here is a kind of intentionality, pervasive in human mental life,
that is constitutively determined by phenomenology alone.”5
Despite its initial plausibility, Charles Travis has recently launched an attack
on the Strong Content View.6 The idea behind Travis’ main argument is that
phenomenology cannot uniquely determine representational content, and hence
that perceptual experience could not be representational. Travis further argues
that, contrary to Brentano and his followers, the mental is not essentially rep-
resentational (intentional). In other words, representation is always derivative
in the sense that something/someone takes something to represent thus and so.
In this paper, I will focus on Travis’ argument from indeterminacy of repre-
sentational content and argue that although Travis’ argument could plausibly
show that, contra the representationalists I mentioned above, looks are not by
themselves representational, it does not affect a weaker view–that perceptual
experience has to be representational due to the way the visual system works.
Call this the Weak Content View (or the WCV for short).7
2 Travis’ Argument
Unfortunately, Travis’ writings are not very accessible. As a result, people have
reconstructed his argument in different ways. But I believe that the following
formulation is a charitable reading of Travis’ position.8
Let’s begin with a background on different uses of ‘look’ (and other appear-
ance words like ‘seem’ and ‘appear’). Following Roderick Chisholm, we may
identify three uses of the word.9 One rather uncontroversial use is the compar-
ative use. When I say that “John looks like his older brother,” Chisholm would
say that I have used ‘look’ in a comparative sense. Another use of the term, the
epistemic use, occurs when I use ‘look’ to report the content of an inference. For
instance, suppose that I hear on the radio that bus drivers are on strike today,
and I tell my friend that “It looks (/seems) as if you have to drive me to school
today.” Chisholm recognizes a third use of ‘looks’ whose contents are purport-
edly grounded in the phenomenology of perceptual experience. For instance,
when I say “This car looks red” based on my visual experience of the car, the
word ‘looks’ has been used to report the content of my visual experience. He
4Schellenberg (2011: 722). Emphases added.
5Horgan and Tienson (2002: 520). Emphasis added.
6Travis (2004).
7For a similar view, see Brogaard (2015).
8For similar readings of Travis’ argument, see Broggard (2015), Raleigh (2013), and Schel-
lenberg (2014). Here, in this section, I mainly rely on Brogaard’s (and Raleigh’s) interpreta-
tions of Travis. A different reading of the argument is presented by Byrne (2009).
9Chisholm, (1957).
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calls this use of the term the phenomenal use.
Travis denies the existence of this last category. In particular, he argues
that if perceptual experiences have contents, their contents should be uniquely
expressible in terms of look statements.10 Then he tries to show that looks
could not fix the content of perceptual states. Given that representationalists
(roughly) argue that perceptual experience has content p when it (phenome-
nally) looks to S that p, it should not be implausible to claim that if perceptual
states represent, their contents need to be given by looks (or look statements).11
Even externalists about mental content have to agree, otherwise it is not clear
how the subject finds out what her mental states represent. However, Travis
argues that looks (or, alternatively, look statements) could not fix the content
of perceptual states. In other words, he denies that there is a phenomenal
use of the word which fixes the content of one’s perceptual experiences. He
acknowledges only two uses of the word ‘look’.
One use, which corresponds to Chisholm’s comparative use, is when someone
says, for instance, “Pia looks like her sister” or “That ball looks like a tomato.”
This use of ‘look’ does not fix a specific content. For instance, Pia could look
like her sister in many different ways, or an object could look like a tomato
with respect to, for instance, its color, shape, etc. Thus, this use of ‘look’ is not
an appropriate candidate for giving the representational content of perceptual
states.
Travis recognizes another use of ’look’, corresponding to Chisholm’s epis-
temic use, which has determinate contents. However, its contents are not fixed
only by visual phenomenology; rather, they are fixed given one’s beliefs and
other epistemic states.12 For instance, the way a tomato in daylight looks could
represent that the tomato is red. However, Travis argues that the content of
the look in such a case is determined, at least partially, by other things, in-
cluding one’s beliefs and other epistemic attitudes. To put it another way,
phenomenology alone could not fix the content of one’s experience. Thus, there
is no separate category of looks which have fixed contents solely in virtue of the
way things phenomenally look.13
10“One idea would be that it is looks-indexing that makes such facts available to us; the
representational content of an experience can be read off of the way, in it, things looked.”
Travis (2004: 69)
11Siewert (1999), Siegel (2010), Chalmers (2004). Also see Pautz (2009) for different formu-
lations of this view. I assume that different sides of the debate accept that look statements
report contents of looks (as mental states or events). Thus moving between look statements
and looks should be harmless.
12Travis (2004: 77).
13It is worth noting that Travis is not alone in his criticism of Chisholm’s tripartite analysis
of appearance words. A more recent analysis of look statements is that of Martin (2010).
Although Martin believes that his analysis is consistent with a representational theory of
perception, he does agree with Travis at least in that “there are no true phenomenal look
statements that concern things looking red or looking square.” Martin (2010, pp. 163 & 223)
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Here is Travis’ argument from indeterminacy of phenomenology:
1. If perceptual experiences represent, their content has to be determinate.
2. Perceptual content is determined by looks.
3. Looks, by themselves, do not have determinate contents.
4. Therefore, perceptual experiences do not represent.
The first premise of this argument does not seem to be controversial among
representationalists. As I mentioned above, most representationalists accept
(2) as well. Given (1) and (2), if perceptual experience represents, its content
needs to be determined merely by a look. However:
A peccary, confronted in the right way, may look exactly like a pig
[. . . ]. It may also look like a tapir, a clever dummy pig, a wax im-
itation peccary, and so on. Experience cannot coherently represent
it to us as both a peccary and wax (and a pig, and so on).14
Therefore, according to Travis, looks by themselves do not deliver determinate
contents. However, if experience represents at all, it has to represent all these
scenarios. But, since the representational content cannot coherently consist of
all these scenarios, experience is not representational.
3 Content Comes Back
In the rest of this paper I will argue that Travis’ argument fails. I begin by
looking at Travis’ account of error. Then, after a short review of some other
na¨ıve realist solutions to the problem of perceptual error, I build up a schematic
argument which is intended to put forward a schema, rather than a single argu-
ment, for a defense of the WCV. Thus, in the first step, I argue that na¨ıve realist
explanations of perceptual error are problematic. Yet these cases could be easily
handled given a representational account. In the next step, I argue that Travis’
argument, though very insightful, does not show that perceptual experience is
not representational. Finally, I will put forward a positive argument according
to which only if perceptual experience is representational can we account for
how we can enjoy fine-grained and highly determinate phenomenal experiences
from highly underdetermined stimuli.
Two points are in order. First, my argument is, again, a schematic defense
of visual content. That is, even if one thinks that na¨ıve realists could have
other explanations of perceptual error in their repertoire, the opponent could
replace the first step of the argument with similar criticisms of the alternative
14Travis (2004: 73).
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explanations. Second, my arguments should be understood as a defense of
the Weak Content View rather than representationalism. I only show that
perceptual experience has to be representational, and this is not the same as
saying that the representational content exhausts phenomenal character, or even
that phenomenal character is intrinsically representational.
3.1 Perceptual Error as Erroneous Judgment
By denying that perceptual experience has representational content, Travis sug-
gests that perception should be understood as a direct (i.e., unmediated) relation
between perceivers and their surroundings. Thus, perception could not relate
you to non-existent objects and properties. However, according to the content
theorist, we sometimes seem to experience things not as they really are. A stick
that is half immersed in water may look as if it is bent when it is not really
bent; or while driving on a hot sunny day, you may seem to see a shimmering
puddle of water on the road where there is no water. Given that Travis takes
perception to be a metaphysically unmediated relation between perceivers and
their surroundings, he needs to offer an account of these abnormal cases and
of perceptual errors more generally in cases in which there is nothing there for
the perceiver to be related to. In what follows, I discuss Travis’ explanation of
perceptual errors.
Consider an optical illusion like the one in figure 1, which is known as the
Kanizsa Triangle Illusion. People normally report that they see a white equi-
lateral triangle in this picture. However, precisely speaking, there is no triangle
in this picture.
Figure 1: Kanizsa Triangle
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Optical illusions such as this one pose a threat to Travis’ view about the
nature of perceptual experience. According to Travis’ relationalist account of
perception,
perception simply places our surrounding in view; it confronts us
with what is there [. . . ]. It makes us aware, to some extent, of
things (around us) being as they are. . . . Perception cannot present
things as being other than they are. It cannot present some way
things are not as what is so. That would not be mere confrontation.
So it cannot represent anything as so. Representation, by nature, is
liable to be of what is not so.15
Travis’ explanation requires something to be there to be perceived; awareness
needs to be awareness of something. Or as he puts it, perception cannot present
things the way they are not because perception is mere confrontation with what
is there. By contrast, in order to represent O, it is not necessary for O to be
present or even exist. The representationalist could say that although there is no
triangle in the Kanizsa Triangle Illusion, one’s experience represents (or rather,
misrepresents) a white triangle in the middle of the picture. The explanation is
simple: representation by its nature “is liable to be of what is not so.” Therefore,
it seems that the case of optical illusions fits well with the representationalist
account of perceptual experience.
Nevertheless, matters are not so simple. Travis has an explanation of per-
ceptual error which at the same time is a potential objection to my account
of the Kanizsa Triangle. He argues that, such cases, we fail to take what we
confront for what it is. As he puts it, “perception leads me astray only where I
judge erroneously, failing to make out what I confront for what it is.”16 In other
words, error happens at a cognitive level, where I make a judgment, not at the
level of perceptual experience, where I am merely confronted with the world as
it is.
Travis’ use of the role of judgment in perceptual error could be understood
in different ways. One way to understand it is to take perceptual error to be
due to one’s voluntary judgments, where by a “voluntary judgment” I mean
a judgment over which one has voluntary control. The judgment that p is a
voluntary judgment when one can judge that p, or withhold judgment that p,
or judge that p. If this is what Travis means by erroneous judgment, then
in any case of perceptual error, one must be able to change one’s judgments
and thus get rid of the error. So, for instance, if my illusive experience in the
Kanizsa Triangle is due to an erroneous judgment over which I have voluntary
control, I must in principle be able to withhold that judgment (and thus change
15Travis (2004: 65).
16Travis (2004: 65).
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the way things look to me), which seems absurd.17
Another way to understand Travis is to attribute perceptual errors to judg-
ments which are automatically produced along with certain perceptual states.
This interpretation needs to be accompanied by an appropriate account of cog-
nitive phenomenology and an account of how one is led to mistake a judgment
for a perceptual experience; also, one needs to explain how it is that these judg-
ments are produced only in certain cases and not in others. In other words,
how does the visual system (or one’s cognitive systems) decide to produce such
a judgment whenever one is looking at the Mu¨ller-Lyer lines and not when one
looks at an apple?
Nevertheless, a deeper problem for any cognitive account of perceptual error,
in general, comes from perceptual psychology. We know that the retinal image
is in some crucial ways under-determinate and highly impoverished. First of
all, the retinal image is two-dimensional, whereas we enjoy three-dimensional
visual experiences.18 Second, the stimulus that reaches one’s retina is infinitely
indeterminate with respect to different objects’ luminance properties.19 So, the
retinal image is indeterminate with respect to depth, orientation, and different
objects’ luminance properties; and thus, in principle, it could be mapped into
an infinite number of different three-dimensional scenes with infinitely many
different luminance properties (Figure 2).
Figure 2: Infinitely many different 3-D objects with different sizes, orientations,
distances, (and speeds) could produce the same 2-D retinal image.(Perves et al.
(2011))
How does the visual system solve the problem? Well, there is no straight-
forward way to pick out the corresponding scene. Nevertheless, thanks to per-
ceptual psychology, we know that the visual system avoids these underdeter-
mination problems by “making a lot of highly plausible assumptions about the
nature of the environment and the conditions under which it is viewed.”20 What
these assumptions (or heuristics, as Palmer puts it21) exactly are and what they
17See: Pylyshyn (1999).
18Palmers (1999: 23).
19Gilchrist et al. (1999).
20Palmer (1999: 23).
21Ibid
7
are supposed to do is a matter of debate (I will come back to this issue in section
3.4). However, what is important for my present purpose is that this process of
relying on assumptions is not infallible after all: sometimes the visual system
relies on wrong assumptions, resulting in visual error. In such cases, the error
happens to cause a mismatch between one’s (reconstructed) visual experience
and the external scene.22 The visual system makes unconscious assumptions
about different aspects of the perceived scene. Sometimes these assumptions
are not accurate, and thus the resulting experience does not accurately present
(/represent) the way the perceived scene really is.
According to most theories in perceptual psychology, at least some cases of
perceptual error are due to inaccurate assumptions of the perceptual system, in
the above sense, over which the subject has no control: In order to disambiguate
Figure 3: “Valley” (By Akiyoshi Kitaoka)
the retinal stimulus, the visual system needs to rely on some further assump-
tions. For instance, the visual system normally assumes that light comes from
above. Or, it relies on texture gradient, that is the changing size of the elements
of a picture, as in the square elements in Figure 3, as a cue to the depth of the
perceived scene. The retinal image accompanied with the unconscious assump-
tions of the visual system forms one’s conscious visual experience. Therefore,
the inaccurate assumptions affect the experience itself.
22In order to see how perceptual psychology could account for error in this way see: Howe
et al. (2005) and Purves et al. (2011). A more developed version of the cognitive account of
error is that of Brewer (2008). I believe that Brewer’s account has similar problems. For a
discussion of Brewer’s account see: Shahmoradi (ms).
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The visual system crucially needs these assumptions in order to disambiguate
the retinal image. So, if they are erroneous in a certain case, then the resulting
experience itself will be erroneous. If, on the other hand, they are accurate, the
resulting experience will be veridical. Thus, the formation of perceptual expe-
rience in general depends on these assumptions. Regardless of what the nature
of these assumptions is, and regardless of whether they are representational or
not, the visual system has to rely on them to turn the underdetermined retinal
image into a determinate conscious experience.
If this account of the visual system is plausible, it shows that at least some
cases of error are experiential. Accepting that perceptual error is experiential is
not compatible with metaphysical direct realism according to which “perception
cannot present things as being other than they are. It cannot present some way
things are not as what is so. That would not be mere confrontation.”23
The naive realist could still offer more complicated accounts of error. For
instance, one might think that perceptual error could be due to unconscious
judgments which occur after the perceptual experience is formed and affect
one’s beliefs about the experience. I do not need to rule out this or other
more complicated accounts of perceptual error. However, as I explained above,
according to our best theories in perceptual psychology experience itself could
be erroneous. Plus, again, these more complicated accounts of perceptual error
need to be accompanied with appropriate accounts of cognitive phenomenology,
as well as an error theory which tells us how it is that one tends to mistake the
content of the alleged mistaken judgments with one’s experience.24
Before I move on, I need to highlight few points. First, the psychological
explanation of error given above is part of a more comprehensive paradigm in
perceptual psychology which provides explanations for a variety of phenom-
ena, including normal perceptual experience of depth, luminance, orientation,
different sorts of constancies, and binocular rivalry. So, it is not a single ad
hoc explanation offered specifically for error. Second, the possibility of error
in perceptual experience is not a problem merely for the na¨ıve realist accounts
of error. Rather, it is a threat for naive realism itself according to which in
perceptual experience we are merely confronted with what is out there. Thus it
is not clear how, for instance, illusive appearance of depth creeps into this un-
mediated confrontation relation when one looks at Figure 3.25 Third, one might
be tempted to argue that the unconscious (impersonal) assumptions that the
visual system employs are representational and conclude that perceptual expe-
23Travis (2004: 65).
24I believe that naive realism’s resistance to the possibility of error in experience and their
cognitive accounts of error spring from a Gibsonian approach to vision. As is well-known,
Gibsonians do not accept that the visual system faces an underdeterminacy problem as I
explained it in this paper. However, there seems to be little or no support for this approach
in contemporary perceptual psychology. See: Palmer (1999: 54-55).
25See: Shahmoradi (ms).
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rience is, too. I do not find this line of argument plausible for familiar reasons.
For instance, it is not very clear how these subpersonal representations could
be used to explain personal-level phenomena. Moreover, though very doubtful,
some people have argued that it might be possible to give an alternative ac-
count of these sub-personal judgments in terms of constraints or biases of the
perceptual system.26
3.2 Na¨ıve Realism and Perceptual Error
I considered Travis’ account of perceptual error and showed that it is not after
all a plausible account of error. I also argued that some cases of perceptual error
are experiential. However, the naive realist could argue that Travis’ explanation
of perceptual error is not the only game in town. So let’s take a quick look at
some other possible strategies that are available to the na¨ıve realist.
It is quite well known that na¨ıve realism has a hard time dealing with per-
ceptual error: if a perceptual relation to things, as they really are, constitutes
our veridical experiences, as the na¨ıve realist claims, how is it that we sometimes
experience things as they are not?
Some naive realists might want to extend their treatment of hallucination
to the case of illusions. They generally could provide either a positive account
of error or an account of error in negative terms. As a positive account, for
instance, the na¨ıve realist could explain error by appealing to non-physical ob-
jects and properties (e.g., sense data) or provide some other, more complicated
theories. Mark Johnston, for instance, argues that while in veridical perception
we are aware of instantiations of sensible profiles. . . when we hal-
lucinate, on the other hand, we are only aware of the structured
qualitative parts of such sensible profiles. Any case of hallucination
is thus a case of ‘direct’ visual awareness of less than one would be
‘directly’ aware of in the cases of seeing.”27
No matter how the na¨ıve realist tries to give a positive account of non-veridical
perception, they all face what is known as the screening-off problem.28
The problem basically is this: suppose in the bad cases of perceptual expe-
rience what one seems to perceive is what we might call a mere profile. It seems
that certain brain activities are sufficient for the subject to have a hallucination
(or illusion) of some mere profile, no matter whether such a profile is being in-
stantiated somewhere in the world or not. If this is right, then we may wonder
whether the same kind of brain activities in the good cases of perception is suf-
ficient for having the experience of the same kind of profile too. Let’s suppose
26See: Orlandi (2014).
27Johnston (2004: 135-137). Note that Mark Johnston does not defend na¨ıve realism. Here
I am only using his version of positive disjunctivism.
28Martin (2004).
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that, in the good case, these brain activities are sufficient for having the expe-
rience of the same kind of profile. Then it is not clear whether we have or need
anything over and above the mere profile in the good case. Thus, it seems that
the mere profile screens off the object-involving phenomenal character from
explaining why the subject’s experience is what it is.
Nevertheless, the na¨ıve realist’s response to the question might be negative:
that is, that brain activities are not sufficient for the subject to have an experi-
ence of the same kind of profile in the good case. Now the na¨ıve realist owes us
an explanation of why the same brain activity is sometimes sufficient for hav-
ing an experience and sometimes not. While the former path pushes the na¨ıve
realist toward sense-data theory, the latter renders the nature of perceptual ex-
perience mysterious, as if the brain has a fancy power to distinguish between
when a perceptual state is being produced by an awareness relation to external
objects and when it is not. The na¨ıve realist’s attempt for a positive account of
perceptual error does not seem to be very promising.
This has forces some na¨ıve realists to characterize perceptual error in nega-
tive terms. Here is the way M.G.F. Martin characterizes hallucination in a na¨ıve
realist framework: a hallucination of an object O is such that it is not possi-
ble to know through reflection that it is not a veridical perception of an O.29
This is a delicate proposal and has several advantages over positive accounts.
However, the negative characterization is not flawless either.30 To mention only
one, it seems that the “through reflection” condition should be strong enough to
prevent one from knowing (through reflection) that one is hallucinating. Thus,
for example, it should rule out, for instance, one’s background beliefs so that
there is no way for the subject to figure out whether or not she is hallucinating.
At the same time, in order for the subject to not know through reflection that
her experience is a hallucination rather than a veridical perception, she has to
have access to her background beliefs about similar cases of veridical percep-
tion. This is a dilemma which Martin’s proposal faces, and there is no easy
way out of it.31 Though a difficult problem, this is only one of the challenges
that Martin’s characterization faces. Although Martin’s account is not the only
negative account of perceptual error in the literature, other available strategies
are not promising either.32
Given the above discussion, it should be clear that perceptual error is a
serious challenge for the na¨ıve realist. Nevertheless, let’s consider another rel-
atively recent defense of a cognitive account of error which could be regarded
as a more plausible interpretation of Travis’ proposal.33 Recently, some na¨ıve
29Martin (2006: 364).
30See: Fish (2010: 102), also Siegel (2004).
31See: Sturgeon (2006) and Fish (2010).
32Another negative proposal is that of Fish (2009). For a critique of Fish’s views, see Siegel
(2008). For Bill Brewer’s account of perceptual error, see Brewer (2008).
33Genone (2014).
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realists have suggested that illusions, for instance, should be taken to be per-
ceptual, that is, as perceptual experiences which the subject has of objective
appearances. According to this account, (illusive) appearances are objective
properties of objects, and thus nothing abnormal happens when one is having
an experience of, say, a straight stick in water which looks as if it is bent, except
that one might erroneously judge that it is bent. If this is right, then no error
occurs at the perceptual level. The way the stick looks could be accounted for
given facts about the stick, water, and light refraction.
At least prima facie, it is plausible that some appearances are objective
properties of objects. However, it is very doubtful that this could be extended
to all cases of illusions (and hallucinations). As I argued above, at least some
cases of perceptual error occur due to the underdeterminacy of the stimuli and
the fact that the visual system has to rely on further assumptions to make up
for what has been lost in the retinal image. As Snowden et al. put it, “our
visual system can, and frequently does, get it wrong. It does not represent the
physical world correctly because it makes assumptions about the world and uses
these to give us the information we need.”34
Here is one example. In Figure 3, the center of the figure looks as if it is dis-
appearing into the distance, which gives it a three-dimensional look. However,
as a matter of fact, it is a two-dimensional figure, and all the lines are straight.
The textbook explanation for the illusive look of depth is that since the retinal
image is two-dimensional, the visual system has to rely on further assumptions
to reconstruct the depth. During the course of its evolution, our visual system
has learned that texture gradient is a cue to the depth of the perceived scene.
Although in many cases texture gradient gives a good cue to the depth of the
perceived scenes, and thus the assumption helps us have accurate perceptions
of depth, sometimes the visual system is fooled by the assumption in question,
as we see in the figure 3.
Another well-known assumption of this kind is what is known as the light-
from-above assumption.35 The idea is that since most light in our environment,
including the light coming from the sun and most other light sources, comes
from above, the visual system has evolved to form such an assumption which
is responsible for some optical illusions as well as some accurate cases of depth
perception. These assumptions have enabled the visual system to track objective
features of the environment which are not directly available to the visual system
and thus have helped the organism to interact with its environment in an efficient
way. However, that does not mean that these assumptions are being employed
in an infallible way. Figure 3 is obviously a two-dimensional figure, and cannot
have depth as one of its objective features. Therefore, I conclude that there
34Snowden et al. (2012: 8).
35Kleffner & Ramachandran (1992).
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are cases of error which are experiential and due to the structure of the visual
system, rather than being perceptual experiences of objective appearances.
Of course, these are not the only possible proposals that a na¨ıve realist could
in principle come up with, and I am not suggesting that the path to a better
solution is logically blocked. However, in the absence of a better proposal, and
given that Travis’ anti-content argument does not rule out the Weak Content
View, there is no reason to balk at an account of perceptual experience according
to which perceptual experiences are representational.
3.3 What Is in a Look?
Now, let’s go back to Travis’ argument from indeterminacy of looks. I admit
that, in principle, it is possible that (phenomenal) looks do not determine repre-
sentational content by themselves. In other words, a certain (phenomenal) look
could in principle represent more than one state of affairs. However, this insight
does not lead to Travis’ anti-content thesis.
Travis’ argument teaches us that looks are not representational indepen-
dently from one’s higher-order epistemic states. This insight blocks a very
common line of argument that goes directly from looks to their being repre-
sentational. Having said that, Travis could reject a widely held view shared by,
among others, Siewert, Schellenberg, and Chalmers, who move from (phenome-
nal) looks to their having accuracy conditions and representational content. 36
The basic idea behind these arguments is that:
[V]isual experiences are assessable for accuracy in virtue of their phe-
nomenal character. . . . [Thus] it would be accurate if and only if
there is an object with an appropriate shape in front of the subject.
If this is right, then a phenomenal property entails a pure represen-
tational property (roughly, representing that there is an object with
a certain shape in the world).37
Travis, however, tells us that phenomenology simpliciter fails to give accuracy
conditions in the sense we are concerned with, and thus that the above argument
is implausible.38
Now given that looks need not be representational, proponents of the Weak
Content View need to do two things. First of all, they need to argue for why
36Siewert (1999), Chalmers (2004), Schellenberg (2014).
37Chalmers (2004: 158).
38Moreover, the arguments from how things appear in visual experience even if successful,
would not be very helpful in the dialectic between the representationalist and the naive realist.
As Adam Pautz has argued, these arguments either deliver a trivially weak notion of content
which is perfectly compatible with naive realism, or else cobert some substantial debates, for
instance the debate over which properties could be represented in experience, into debates
about whether it is grammatical to say, for instance, “O looks pine tree”. See: Pautz (2009).
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one should take perceptual experience to be representational in the first place.
Since, I believe, there is no direct argument from how things look in visual ex-
perience to its having content, I suggest that we need to rely on the explanatory
role of representational content. The idea is that our best theories of vision tell
us that, in order to enjoy the visual experiences that we have, the visual system
has to turn the retinal image into a representation of the perceived scene, given
further assumptions about the environment and the viewing conditions.39 These
assumptions enable the visual system to reconstruct visual representations out
of highly impoverished and indeterminate inputs. As I will explain in the next
section (§3.4), this could not be accounted for given a perceptual relation be-
tween the perceiver and the perceived objects and properties. Second, one needs
to show how the kind of content defended in the first step could be compati-
ble with anti-content arguments, like that of Travis. The suggestion is that we
should reject the widely held assumption that visual content is determined by
looks (Travis’ second premise). In other words, I agree with Travis that looks,
by themselves, do not deliver determinate contents. This is perfectly compatible
with visual experience’s being representational for other reasons. In particular,
I argue that our visual experience is representational due to the structure of the
visual system.
3.4 Why Do We Need Perceptual Content?
It used to be the bedrock of traditional perceptual psychology that the function
of the perceptual system in general, and the visual system in particular, is to
give the perceiving organism a veridical experience of its surroundings. This
seems to be a pretty plausible assumption. Many have assumed that perceptual
experience could not be evolutionarily useful unless it provides the organism
with a veridical experience of how the world is. According to this view, a
normally working visual system is like a transparent glass. It does not interfere
with the way the other side of the glass looks to the observer, and it only has
a minimal causal role.40 However, recently some neuroscientists and perceptual
psychologists have questioned this assumption. They argue that it is not clear
why the visual system needs to provide the organism with a veridical experience
of its surroundings. Rather, the visual system, first and foremost, needs to
facilitate the organism’s interaction with its environment and enhance its fitness.
This could be done with less than veridical experience.41
Here is how the visual system, according to this view, works. The stimulus
that the visual system receives is highly underdetermined. The visual system
39Note that I do not take these (impersonal) assumptions to be representational.
40Palmer (1999: 6), Geisler and Diehl (2003). See also Campbell (2002: 116) and Fish
(2009, 137).
41Purves (2011), Howe et al. (2006), Singh and Hoffman (2013).
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initially has no way to get around the problem, so it relies on these highly
underdetermined inputs to help the organism move around and interact with
its environment. Then, “using feedback from the outcome of visually guided
behavior in the past,”42 the visual system modifies the organism’s perceptual
experiences. According to this view the ultimate goal of the visual system is
to enable the organism to behave successfully in its environment. Many people
have assumed that the output of a visual system evolved in this way finally
converges toward another visual system that is tuned to veridicality. If so, then
the best way for the visual system to enhance the organism’s fitness would be
to turn into a “transparent glass” described above. However, there are good
reasons to think that this is not the case.
Here is why: as I mentioned above, a specific pattern of light on the retina
could be caused by different environmental configurations. Assume that one
of these configurations, which happens not to be the most probable cause of
that specific retinal pattern, has a biological significance for the organism. It
is natural to think that the organism’s vision should evolve to track the signifi-
cant cause in question rather than the most probable one. Therefore, the most
probable cause of a retinal pattern does not necessarily correspond to, evolu-
tionarily speaking, its most significant cause.43 Moreover, thanks to simulation
methods using evolutionary games and genetic algorithms, we could simulate an
organism’s behavior in the natural environment, once with a visual system that
is tuned to veridicality and once with a different visual system that is governed
by fitness. The results are striking:
We tested this assumption [that vision tracks truth] using standard
tools of evolutionary game theory. We found that truer percep-
tions need not be more fit: Natural selection can send perfectly,
or partially, true perceptions to extinction when they compete with
perceptions that use niche-specific interfaces which hide the truth
in order to better represent utility. Fitness and access to truth are
logically distinct properties. More truthful perceptions do not entail
greater fitness.44
Thus, the very intuitive idea that the two visual systems will finally converge
is not correct. This way of looking at the underdeterminacy problem suggests
that visual experience is not a simple function tuned to veridicality; rather it is
tuned to fitness which, in turn, depends not only on the way the environment
is, but also on the organism, its current state and its actions.45 Therefore, the
resulting percepts in the two visual systems tuned respectively to fitness and
42Purves et al. (2002).
43Orlandi (2014, p. 70).
44Mark et al. (2010). Also, see: Hoffman and Prakash (2014), Singh and Hoffman (2013).
45Singh and Hoffman (2013: 176).
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veridicality need not and, as a matter fact, do not converge. As a result, what
we see is, evolutionarily speaking, what has proved to serve our needs better in
the past, rather than what is actually out there.
If this account of the perceptual system’s operation is roughly correct, then a
representational account of perceptual experience would naturally follow. Why?
Well, a relation between the subject and the perceived objects and properties
cannot determine the character of one’s experience. As I understand it, ac-
cording to the naive realist, when the perceptual relation between the subject
and her environment obtains, as Brewer puts it, “the core subjective charac-
ter of perceptual experience is given simply by citing the physical object which
is its mind-independent direct object.”46 However, according to the picture I
presented above, the subjective character of experience need not be given by
citing its direct physical objects. A normally operating perceptual system is
not committed to, and does not guarantee that, how things perceptually appear
is the same as how things really are. The visual system does not overcome the
underdeterminacy of the retinal image by making inferences which reveal the
underlying state of distal objects. As Purves et al. (2002) put it:
what we perceive accords not with the features of the retinal stimulus
or the properties of the underlying objects, but with what the same
or similar stimuli have typically signified in both the experience of
the species over the eons and the experience of the individuals over
their lifetimes.47
In other words, the driving force behind the visual system is not coming from
metaphysical direct realism; rather the visual system is governed by natural
selection. After all, if the organism could meet its biological needs without
going through the labyrinth of having a veridical experience of the world which
demands much more energy and time48, why would the organism bother to
choose the latter?
Therefore, it is natural to assume that, in the absence of full access to the
way the world is, the visual system puts the organism in a state that represents
its environment as being a certain way. Otherwise how could we account for
the transition from the highly underdetermined inputs that the visual system
receives to the fine-grained visual experiences that we normally enjoy? Either
the relation between the perceiver and the perceived object and properties fully
determines the phenomenal character of the experience, or else the visual system
represents the perceived scene in the absence of such a relation. However, as I
argued above, the relation between the subject and her environment could not
46Brewer (2008: 171). Remember that this is restatement of what we called “metaphysical
direct realism.” Travis (2004), Campbell (2002: 116), and Fish (2009: 6).
47Perves et al. (2002: 236)
48Singh and Hoffman (2013).
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fully determine the character of her perceptual experience.49
4 Conclusion
Most representationalists have either assumed that perceptual experience has
content or, at best, argued for perceptual content given unexamined assumptions
about the nature of looks. So it should not be very surprising that Travis’ 2004
paper brought about a great shock in the representationalist camp. However,
I think the force of Travis’ argument has been overstated, not because it does
not wreak havoc on the representationalist camp, but because it affects only a
specific sort of arguments for perceptual content, namely the arguments that
take perceptual content to be determined by looks. As it happened, that was
the main, maybe even the only, argument that representationalists had in their
repertoire for perceptual content. However, perceptual experience could be
representational for other reasons. Specifically, it could be representational due
to the way the visual system works.50
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